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Abstract 
 
Starting in 2004 the Guyanese foreign exchange rate has been remarkably stable relative 
to earlier periods. This paper explores the reasons for the stability of the rate. First, the 
degree of concentration in the foreign exchange market has increased, thus making the 
task of moral suasion relatively straightforward once this policy tool comes to bear on the 
dominant trader (s).  Second, long-term or non-volatile capital inflows make the 
exchange rate less susceptible to sudden reversal. Third, commercial banks, the dominant 
foreign exchange traders, have large outlays of assets in domestic currency, thus their 
desire for exchange rate stability. The econometric exercise is consistent with the notion 
that trader market power has contributed to lower volatility in the G$/US exchange rate. 
The paper also presents a model that analyzes monetary policy effects in the presence of 
a mark-up or threshold interest rate.   
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1. Introduction 
 
As part of a broad macroeconomic reform agenda implemented in 1988, Guyana 
adopted a floating exchange rate in 1990 (Egoume-Bossogo et al, 2003; Thomas and 
Rampersaud, 1991). The parallel or street rate was merged with the official rate as one 
aspect of comprehensive macroeconomic and financial sector reforms. A notable spread, 
prior to 1990, existed between the official and parallel rates; however, as the reforms 
intensified the spread declined and the rates converged (Fardmanesh and Douglas, 2008).  
The agenda of foreign exchange market reform was not limited to Guyana. Instead, it was 
a widespread reform movement in other parts of the world such as the Caribbean and 
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African economies (Fardmanesh and Douglas, 2008; Galbis, 1993). The banking and 
financial sector reforms pursued in Guyana included: promoting financial market 
development, decontrolling interest rate, implementing market-based monetary policy 
through a Treasury bill auctioning framework, privatizing state-owned banks, and 
dismantling direct credit schemes (Das and Ganga, 1997; Egoume-Bossogo et al, 2003).  
Starting from around 2004, despite the extensive nature of the financial reforms, 
the exchange rate moved from a relatively flexible to a virtually fixed rate
1
. This regime 
shift went unnoticed to most except the IMF which started to classify Guyana as having a 
de facto pegged exchange rate regime (IMF, 2006). Heretofore, the academic literature 
has not analyzed this silent transition; thus this paper intends to make a contribution in 
that regard. However, using a probit model, Hagen and Zhou (2005) examine the factors 
allowing for a divergence between de facto and official exchange rate regimes in twenty-
five Transition economies. They argue that it is less costly to adjust the de facto exchange 
rate because less commitment is required.  
Upon examination of the institutional features of the foreign exchange market, the 
paper argues that this market is highly concentrated where a few commercial banks 
dominate the trading of foreign currencies. Therefore, we postulate that trader market 
power and high concentration (in the foreign exchange market) helps in the stabilization 
of the rate. In addition, given that commercial banks, in the aggregate, possess a large 
portfolio of assets in domestic currency (loans, treasury bills and excess reserves), it is 
not in their interest to see the nominal exchange rate depreciate rapidly because of the 
potential inflation pass-through. Therefore, to the extent that moral suasion is used as a 
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 The issue of exchange rate stability is important because volatility tend to be inversely related to 
economic growth (Schnabl, 2008). 
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monetary management tool, it is more likely to succeed given the institutional features of 
the Guyanese foreign exchange market
2
.    
Moreover, the paper also hypothesizes that the nature of capital inflows facilitates 
and buttresses the market power role of the commercial banks in stabilizing the rate
3
. 
Portfolio or hot money inflows are very small relative to stable long-term capital inflows. 
The latter include foreign direct investments, remittances, aid funds, and multinational 
loans. Remittances form an important source of foreign exchange inflows; therefore, to 
the extent the altruistic motive to remit is dominant, this form of foreign exchange inflow 
eases the exchange rate volatility and reinforces the strategic exchange rate formation 
role of the large commercial bank traders
4
.  
The paper adopts a three-tier methodology to present its case. Firstly, we present a 
narrative approach outlining stylized facts and features of the Guyana foreign exchange 
market. Secondly, we present a simple model that illustrates how a threshold domestic 
interest rate influences the central bank’s management of commercial bank reserves (as is 
done under the financial programming model).  The threshold is identified by an 
aggregate commercial bank liquidity preference curve that becomes flat at the interest 
threshold, which is assumed to be a mark-up over the foreign interest rate. Thirdly, we 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that the central bank has never announced that moral suasion is part of its monetary 
policy toolkit. Instead, the central bank indicates that it follows an indirect monetary policy tool that 
manages commercial bank excess reserves. However, Egoume-Bossogo et al (2003) suggest that moral 
suasion was exercised during 1996-97 when there was major political unrest.  
 
3
 Sudden swings in capital inflows – especially short-term inflows – can be devastating and result in 
bankruptcies, destruction of the credit channel, and impose an adverse effect on human capital (Calvo, 
1998).  
   
4
 Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) found the altruistic motive to be the important factor in determining the 
inflow of remittances into Guyana. 
 
 4 
provide some econometric evidence which models exchange rate volatility and 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background information that 
outlines the de facto pegged rate and other key macroeconomic variables. Section 3 
examines the composition of capital inflows. Section 4 explores the structure and features 
of the foreign exchange market. Section 5 presents several arguments why the rate 
stabilized. Section 6 presents a theoretical model which shows that a binding threshold 
mark-up interest rate could generate a stable exchange rate in the presence of monetary 
expansion. Section 7 provides econometric evidence that shows that exchange rate 
volatility is negatively related to concentration (the market power thesis). Section 8 
concludes. This study focuses on Guyana because the unannounced exchange rate regime 
change presents an opportunity for this type of analysis. Furthermore, we were only able 
to obtain micro level data on foreign exchange traders for Guyana in order to calculate 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for the said economy. However, the banks’ 
liquidity preference curves – central to the analysis of this paper – can be found for other 
economies in addition to Guyana (see Khemraj, 2006).  
2. Background Information 
In November 1989 several bank and non-bank traders (or cambios) were licensed 
to buy and sell foreign currencies at freely determined rates. By March 1990 the cambio 
market system – in which bank and non-bank traders freely buy and sell foreign 
currencies – was implemented. Figure 1 shows the G$/US$ exchange rate from first 
quarter 1991 to last quarter 2009. This is the effective rate as over 90 percent of foreign 
currencies traded are the United States dollar. On the left- axis is the G$/US$ rate. It is 
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obvious the rate depreciated substantially in the early period of the formation of the 
cambio market system; as at end 2009, the exchange rate stood at G$204 for US$1. 
However, by fourth quarter of 2004 the rate stabilized remarkably relative to previous 
periods.  
It is easier to spot the relative stability by looking at the bars (right-axis), which 
shows the change in the exchange rate from one period to the next. Thus a large spike 
shows a large and volatile change in the exchange rate from period to period. On the 
other hand, stability is indicated by a less volatile oscillation of the bar spikes. Moreover, 
when the spike is above zero it signals depreciation, while a spike below zero reflects an 
appreciation of the Guyana dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar. Also reported is the GARCH 
(1, 1) measure of volatility which shows remarkable tranquillity after 2004
5
.   
Table 1 presents selected macroeconomic indicators. The data suggest that the 
external debt ratio continued to decline in the post-2004 period; a noticeable 
accumulation of foreign reserves in 2008 and 2009; and a surplus in the current account 
balance in 2008 and 2009. The unprecedented accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
and the surplus occurred long after the exchange rate stabilized. Otherwise, there is no 
other conspicuous change in the data that provides a clue as to what accounted for the 
stability of the rate in the post-2004 era. There was also no noticeable shift in the 
monetary aggregates that could account for the regime change.  
3. The Nature of Capital Inflows  
Given that the exchange rate can be affected by capital inflows, this section 
outlines the type of capital inflows into the Guyana economy. We are particularly 
                                                 
5
 We follow the suggestions and procedures outlined by Enders (2010) and Brooks (2008) when 
determining the fit for the GARCH (1, 1) model.  According to Brooks (2008) the GARCH (1, 1) model is 
typically sufficient for modeling the conditional volatility.    
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interested in whether the type of capital inflows can suddenly reverse direction and exit. 
The data on key components are presented in Table 2. The main items are long-term 
foreign direct investments and remittances. A study in the Guyanese context found that 
remittance inflows are motivated by senders’ altruism (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). 
Long-term loans and grants to the government also form a main inflow that is not 
susceptible to sudden reversal. Short-term capital inflows, which are made up mainly of 
foreign bank deposits held in Guyana, are relatively small compared with the other 
categories. A precipitous decline in these potentially volatile deposits in 2008 did not 
appear to influence the exchange rate in a substantial manner.  
 
Figure 1. The G$/US$ exchange rate (left-axis) and volatility (right-axis) – 1990: April to 
2010: Aug 
40
80
120
160
200
240
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Volatility of Exchange Rate
Exchange Rate - G$/US$
GARCH (1, 1) of Exchange Rate  
Data source: International Financial Statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Table 1. Selected macroeconomic indicators 
 
Real GDP Growth (%) -1.4 2.3 1.1 -0.7 1.6 -1.9 5.1 5.4 3.1 2.3
Annual Inflation (%) 6.1 2.6 5.3 6.0 4.7 6.9 6.6 12.3 8.1 2.9
Current Account/GDP (%) -15 -18 -15 -11 -9 -19 -28 -18 14 9
Capital Account/GDP (%) 19 16 12 8 5 22 30 16 13 18
External Debt/GDP (%) 170 170 187 162 152 148 115 67 73 74
Reserve Money Growth (%) 14 11 10 10 8 11 5 8 7 24
M1 Growth (%) 15 0 6 17 12 9 27 13 13 9
M2 Growth (%) 11 9 5 8 8 8 16 14 13 10
International Reserves
(US$-Mill) 305 287 284 276 232 252 280 313 356 631
Source: Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance; International Financial Statistics
 
 
Table 2. Capital inflows (US$ millions) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Short-term inflows 19 16 22 21 34 49 50 52 40 50
Foreign direct investments 67 56 44 26 30 77 102 110 184 208
Workers' remittances 47 44 40 47 74 167 216 287 329 300
Long-term loans and grants 66 66 45 68 61 102 107 105 187 135
 Source: Bank of Guyana Annual Report (various years) 
 
4. Features of the FX Market 
The number of bank and non-bank foreign exchange (hereafter FX) traders is 
presented in Table 3, which also provides a summary of the volume of purchases by the 
two categories of traders. We did not report the percentages from the sales quantities as 
they did not change the results in any significant way. It is clear that the volume of 
foreign currencies purchased by the traders has expanded continually since 2000. There 
was a noticeable increase of US$71 million in total purchases in 2004. The total volume 
of US dollar purchased in 2009 grew by US$77 million, accounted for mainly by a steep 
increase of purchases by non-bank traders. Table 3 shows that commercial banks are the 
largest traders accounting for approximately 90 percent of FX purchases.  
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Table 3. Total foreign exchange purchased by traders (US$ million) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Commercial banks 359 378 420 479 534 604 671 860 1052 1065
Non-banks 45 47 51 53 69 70 64 83 72 137
Total purchases 403 425 471 532 603 674 735 943 1125 1202
Commercial banks 89 89 89 90 89 90 91 91 94 89
Non-banks 11 11 11 10 11 10 9 9 6 11
Commercial banks 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Non-banks 24 24 23 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Total FX traders 31 31 30 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Percentages
Number of Traders
Source: Bank of Guyana Annual Report (various years) 
 
The main currencies traded in the market are the US dollar, Canadian dollar and 
the Euro. The US dollar accounts for the largest percentage of all FX trades, persistently 
accounting for approximately 90 percent of all currency trades. The Canadian dollar or 
Euro often switches places for the second spot. There is no central market for foreign 
currency trading; thus trades occur primarily over-the-counter; and there is no trading of 
forward exchange rate contracts in Guyana – thus the exchange rate is a spot rate.  
Figure 2 is consistent with the notion of the existence of market power in the FX 
market. The spread for commercial banks is higher for most of the sample period for 
which data are available. Notwithstanding the fact that the bid-ask spread can be 
determined by other factors
6
, it is important to note that the commercial banks possess the 
higher spread. As indicated by the data given in table 3, the commercial banks are the 
larger traders, despite their smaller numbers. The bank concentration would have been 
enhanced in 2003 given the merger of the state-owned commercial bank (Guyana 
                                                 
6
 For an examination of different determinants of FX market bid-ask spread see Melvin and Tan (1996) and 
Sager and Taylor (2006). 
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National Cooperative Bank) with the private bank (National Bank of Industry and 
Commerce).        
 
Figure 2: Average bid-ask spreads of bank and non-bank cambios (G$), 2000: Jan – 
2009: Dec 
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Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
Since 2004 the level of concentration in the market has increased (see figure 3). 
The high concentration in the market is clearly visible from the computation of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. When this index is graphed with the volatility of the 
G$/US$ exchange rate there appears to be a clear inverse relationship between the two 
variables suggesting the higher concentration is associated with lower volatility. The 
average HHI from 2000 to 2003 was 2897, while for the period 2004 to 2009 it increased 
to 6200. Clearly the degree of concentration increased substantially after 2004, a period 
which coincides with the largest bank merger. An HHI of 10,000 is often associated with 
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a monopoly. Therefore, our calculated HHI appears to be more consistent with an 
oligopolistic FX market. The volatility of the FX rate also tended to decline by over 50 
percent after 2004.  
 
Figure 3: Market concentration (HHI) and GARCH volatility – 2000: Jan to 2009: Dec  
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5. Why the Stabilization of the Exchange Rate?   
There has been no announcement of a formal exchange rate regime shift. 
However, the high concentration of FX trading volumes would make it easy for the large 
commercial banks to set the rate and the others will have to follow. In other words, there 
could be a case of price leadership in the determination of the rate, whereby the large 
volume traders set the rate and the small volume traders follow. The large commercial 
banks possess a nationwide branch network which allows them to mobilize FX with ease 
relative to the non-bank cambios. Moreover, the wide branch network allows for a greater 
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lock-in effect for the public to do over-the-counter trades. Further the larger banks 
provide greater physical security when the public is exchanging funds. The small traders 
are often single entities in the main cities and therefore do not benefit from branch 
networks.   
The degree of market concentration enhances the ability of the central bank to use 
moral suasion, assuming it is used at all
7
. In this case, it is better to influence the 
dominant volume traders or price leaders as they trade most of the foreign currencies. 
Even if the smaller traders would like to set different rates they do not mobilize the 
volumes to do trades that shift the market fundamentally. In addition, should the central 
bank rely on moral suasion, its task is made easier given the nature of capital inflows that 
are not susceptible to sudden swings.   
One might ask what incentive the price leaders would have to desire a stable rate 
or cooperate with the policy makers in the event if moral suasion is used as a policy tool. 
If banks could hoard foreign exchange and the rate depreciates, then they would realize a 
profit in terms of local currency. However, commercial banks, which also trade foreign 
currencies, are more importantly lenders with large loan portfolios in Guyana dollars. 
They also possess an asset portfolio that is liquid in the domestic government securities 
and excess reserves. Therefore, it is not in their interest to have the Guyana dollar 
depreciate rapidly given that importers will pass on the higher import prices to 
consumers. Thus with rising inflation resulting from the depreciation, the banks would 
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 For an empirical analysis of the relationship between bank competition and financial stability see Berger 
et at (2008). Vives (2001) presents a helpful review of different aspect of the literature relating to bank 
competition, stability, regulation and competition policy. These authors look at the issue from the point of 
view of the loan market. In contrast, this paper proposes the hypothesis that banks which are the dominant 
foreign exchange traders, and have large asset outlays in domestic currency, could result in the stabilization 
of the exchange rate.    
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actually realize a loss in loan value and those who borrowed will gain. Also, a rapid 
depreciation could lead to a flight of foreign currency deposits (this is given in table 2 as 
short-term inflows). Table 4 reports the asset composition (in percentages) of commercial 
banks. The table shows that the major asset components are in domestic currency.   
 
Table 4. Asset composition of commercial banks (percentages) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Foreign assets 7 9 10 14 15 18 17 24 22 17
Credit to government 18 17 18 24 26 25 26 21 22 25
Credit to private sector 46 44 41 34 28 27 27 28 29 26
Reserves and deposits at
central bank 14 15 16 16 16 17 16 12 11 14
Other assets 15 16 15 12 14 14 14 14 16 17
Total percentages 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Data source: Bank of Guyana Annual Reports (various years) 
 
6. Bank Liquidity Preference and the Exchange Rate 
 According to the Bank of Guyana (BOG), the main focus of its monetary policy is 
the effective management of reserves in the banking system. The latter is accomplished 
by a financial programming tool that facilitates open market operations consistent with 
forecasts for inflation and international reserves (BOG, 2009; Ganga, 2000). Effective 
management of the exchange rate is seen as essential for maintaining exchange rate and 
price stability. In other words, commercial banks possess a demand for reserves – defined 
as actual reserves plus required reserves – which the central bank must supply based on 
forecasts for inflation and international reserves. In addition, the central bank varies its 
tools of monetary policy consistent with the reserves forecasts of the financial 
programming model (Ganga, 2000). This is the essence of market-based or indirect 
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monetary policy
8
. Moreover, that monetary policy operates on the reserves of banks is 
implicitly recognizing the ability of banks in determining economic outcomes in an 
economy with a bank-dominated financial structure.       
 
Figure 4. Liquidity preference for commercial banks (1998: Q1 to 2009: Q4) 
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Data source: International Financial Statistics 
The empirical demand curve for reserves is presented by figure 4
9
. The curve is 
fitted using quarterly data taken from the International Financial Statistics. The reserves 
level was calculated by subtracting currency in circulation from reserve money. The 
interest rate is the 3-month Treasury bill rate, which was also sourced from the 
International Financial Statistics. Analytically, the curve is the aggregate banking sector 
demand curve for reserves, which the central bank manages using open market 
                                                 
8
 See Balino et al (2005) for outline of the nature of indirect monetary policy.  
 
9
 The curve was fitted using the method of locally weighted regressions with a smoothing factor of 0.4. For 
a detailed explanation of this technique see Cleveland (1979).   
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operations. The empirical curve is downward sloping and it becomes horizontal at a 
Treasury bill rate of approximately 4%. This can be termed a threshold or minimum 
interest rate at which point the banks accumulate reserves passively. Open market 
operations, which shift a vertical reserve supply curve along the liquidity preference 
curve, will have no effect on the rate of interest over the flat segment of the curve.  
An explanation of what is determining the flat segment of the curve is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Suffice to say, while it is akin to the textbook explanation of the 
Keynesian liquidity trap, in the case of Guyana the horizontal segment does not occur at a 
0% interest rate; rather it occurs at around 4%, which implies that banks view non-
remunerated reserves and Treasury bills as perfect substitutes at above zero interest rate. 
One potential explanation given for this occurrence would be Frost (1971) who explained 
that a kinked demand for excess bank reserves in the United States is due to various 
transaction costs. At the point where the market interest rate falls towards the marginal 
transaction cost, the curve is kinked.  
Another explanation comes from Khemraj (2006) who posited the thesis that the 
flat curve represents a minimum mark-up rate; the thesis holds that the mark-up is done 
vis-à-vis a foreign benchmark interest rate – namely the US Treasury bill rate10. The 
latter hypothesis is more applicable in an era of financial openness on the capital account. 
As noted earlier in the paper, Guyana implemented far-reaching reforms in the financial 
sector. Once the market rate falls to the minimum mark-up rate, banks accumulate 
reserves at a greater extent than investing in the domestic asset. In other words, the 
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 For this idea to hold there must be a negative relationship between commercial bank reserves and the 
difference between the Guyana Treasury bill rate and the US Treasury bill rate. This is shown in Appendix 
1. The 3-month Treasury bill rate was used for both economies. The relationship shows that as the spread 
widens reserves decline.  
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demand for reserves is voluntary at the minimum interest threshold (when the curve is 
flat); while it is involuntary over the downward sloping range of the curve. Over the 
involuntary range banks will seek to substitute away from reserves into interest earning 
assets – therefore the central bank must manage the demand for reserves along this 
segment of the curve.  
 
Figure 5. Monetary policy and the threshold rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Therefore, the model which is presented herein to explain the connection between 
exchange rate dynamics and monetary policy – as conceptualized by the Bank of Guyana 
– is based on the empirical observation of an aggregate bank liquidity preference curve. 
Moreover, the model takes into consideration the banking sector’s liquidity preference 
rather than the public’s demand for money, which could be unstable owing to the 
instability of the money multiplier. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration 
the banks’ ability to determine interest rate outcomes asymmetrically.  Although it is 
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beyond the scope of this research, the paper proposes the notion that the threshold rate is 
determined as a mark-up over the rate of interest on a benchmark asset.  At the interest 
threshold non-remunerated reserves and interest-earning Treasury bills are perfect 
substitutes.  
Assume the domestic minimum threshold rate is given by the simple equation 
min (1 )dom Fr m r  ; whereby 
min
domr = the domestic minimum rate that is reached at the flat 
curve. m = the mark up factor that could be determined by bank preferences, risk, market 
power and other factors, and Fr is the foreign risk-free rate that serves as the benchmark 
for Guyanese banks. The basic idea is sketched in figure 5.  The latter figure shows that 
when the threshold rate ( mindomr ) is binding, an expansion of bank liquidity along the flat 
liquidity demand curve (RD) – to the right of RS1 – would have no effect in driving down 
further this rate, which is assumed to be set favorably relative to Fr . Commercial banks 
would need to mobilize foreign exchange from the domestic market to meet the foreign 
exchange needs of long established business customers (especially those who have 
outstanding business loans and exposure to international trade).  As postulated earlier, 
commercial banks also would prefer to maintain a stable exchange rate given their large 
exposure of assets in domestic currency. On the other hand, should the central bank 
contract bank reserves by selling them government securities (G), then the domestic rate 
could increase above the threshold to 1domr .  In this case there is the concomitant effect of 
an increase in government securities held by the banks from G1 to G2.   
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The diagrammatic framework could be looked at more formally. Equation 1 is the 
augmented uncovered interest parity (UIP), whereby ts  = the rate of change in the spot 
exchange rate.   
1 (1 )t t dom Fts s r m r            (1) 
 Where 1  .  Given the nature of the liquidity preference curve (figure 4), it is possible 
to approximate the curve as a reciprocal function in which the threshold rate is the 
asymptote. *R represents the equilibrium level of reserves at the point where RD RS . 
 is the coefficient in the function where 0  and min 0domr  .  
min * 1
dom domr r R
          (2)  
 Substituting equation 2 into 1 gives 
min * 1
1 (1 ) (1 )t t dom t Fts s r m m R r 

           (3)  
The term min (1 )domr m is assumed to be constant at least in the short-term – hence there is 
no time index on the expression. Solving equation 3 for its time path using a procedure 
outlined by Enders (2010) gives equation 4, which allows us to derive the dynamic 
multipliers (equations 5a to 5d) showing the effectiveness of monetary policy when the 
threshold interest rate is binding. 0s = the initial exchange rate utilized in the recursive 
solution process.  
min 1 1
0 *
0 0
(1 ) 1
(1 )
1
t t
t i idom
t Ft i
i it
r m
s s m r
R
   

 

 

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
      (4) 
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Figure 6. Dynamic multipliers showing monetary policy effect at the interest threshold  
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 6 graphs the derived multipliers (equations 5a to 5d). This allows us to 
analyze the effect of monetary policy at the minimum interest rate threshold. The 
multipliers are given for three levels of bank reserves. We assume 0.8  , 1.5  and 
0.05m  . The simulation exercise is straightforward: we increase reserves to see what 
happens when the threshold is binding given a change in reserves. The figure shows that 
as reserves increase at the threshold, the response is negative but gets closer to zero. As 
noted earlier, the Bank of Guyana manages bank reserves along a system-wide bank 
demand curve for reserves.  The threshold is determined by the mark-up of the 
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commercial banks. Therefore, monetary policy has less of an exchange rate impact on the 
exchange rate as the threshold comes into effect. 
7. Some Econometric Results 
In this study we employ the GARCH framework to determine whether market 
concentration measured by the HHI impacts the volatility of the G$/US$ exchange rate. 
The HHI is constructed by taking the sum of squares of the market shares of the average 
balance held by each cambio. Our model is similar to that of Egoume-Bossogo et al 
(2003), except that we include a measure of market concentration.  Including the HHI in 
the variance equation allows us to determine how our measure of concentration impacts 
on the volatility of the G$/US$ exchange rate. Similar to Egoume-Bossogo et al (2003), 
we adjust the mean and variance equations to incorporate seasonal effects. The exact 
specifications of the mean and conditional variance equations are as follows:  
12
0 1 1
1
t t ts s D

  

       
12
2 2 2
0 1 1 2 1 3
1
t t t th HHI D

      

      
Monthly data from February 2000 to December 2009 and the quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (QMLE) are used to estimate the GARCH model. We report the 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors as suggested by Brooks (2008). The 
adequacy of our model is examined with several information criteria and non-linearity 
test including the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Ljung-Box Q-statistics.  Table 5 
presents the econometric results. Only statistically significant variables are reported to 
reflect our parsimonious model. Consistent with our thesis that the dominant players 
would take advantage of their market power to minimize the volatility of the exchange 
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rate, we find a statistically significant negative coefficient for the HHI in the variance 
equation. Seasonal dummy variables are added to the equations to capture peculiar 
seasonal effects. It is possible that seasonal variation may be present in our data; early 
studies have noted this tendency also (Thomas and Rampersaud, 1991; Egoume-Bossogo 
et al, 2003). There is no a priori sign restriction for these variables. However, a 
significant positive coefficient for the dummy variable may be interpreted to mean that 
the average exchange rate is relatively larger during certain periods. The converse 
interpretation may be attributed to a significant negative coefficient for the dummy 
variables.  Table 5 reports only the statistically significant seasonal dummy variables and 
the results for the GARCH (1, 1) and the exponential GARCH. Since the threshold term 
was found to be statistically insignificant, we did not report the threshold GARCH model. 
The results indicate that the concentration variable (our proxy for market power) 
is statistically significant in the variance equation and it has the expected negative sign. 
This result is consistent with our thesis that higher market concentration contributes to 
lower volatility in the exchange rate. The small magnitude of the coefficient of HHI 
reflects the low level of variability (and volatility) in the exchange rate for the post-2004 
sample period. Thus, this result should not be interpreted as economically insignificant 
(note the result is statistically significant).  The diagnostic test results are favorable and 
suggest no serial correlation.  
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Table 5: Econometric results 
GARCH (1, 1)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.199 0.050 3.977 0.000
Delta_Exr (-1) -0.252 0.092 -2.739 0.006
D8 -0.234 0.060 -3.940 0.000
C 0.441 0.162 2.726 0.006
ARCH (-1) 0.226 0.089 2.533 0.011
GARCH(-1) 0.530 0.120 4.417 0.000
HHI -0.008 0.001 -7.970 0.000
D4 -0.492 0.130 -3.784 0.000
D8 -0.522 0.120 -4.338 0.000
EGARCH (1, 1)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.298 0.051 5.826 0.000
Delta_Exr (-1) -0.397 0.063 -6.286 0.000
D8 -0.425 0.142 -2.990 0.003
C -0.566 0.542 -1.045 0.296
Abs(RESID(-1)/
SQRT(GARCH(-1))) 0.460 0.111 4.163 0.000
Log(GARCH(-1)) -0.742 0.069 -10.732 0.000
HHI -0.003 0.000 -31.949 0.000
D4 -1.162 0.338 -3.432 0.001
Variance Equation
Mean Equation
Variance Equation
Mean Equation
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 This paper proposed an explanation for the success of the unannounced foreign 
exchange regime change. The key argument advanced in this study is as follows: it is 
easier to implement moral suasion once there is concentration in the foreign exchange 
market. In this case, the monetary authority needs to control via moral suasion the rate 
formation of the price leader, which dominates trading activities in the FX market. The 
large commercial banks, moreover, are likely to cooperate with the monetary authority 
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given their substantial exposure in domestic currency assets that could decline in the 
event of a rapid depreciation of the Guyana dollar and the subsequent inflation pass-
through. Therefore, in contrast to the existing literature which looks at competition and 
stability from the point of the loan market (see Vives, 2001; Berger et al, 2008), this 
paper examines how concentration in the FX market could engender macroeconomic 
stability through the stabilization of the exchange rate. A second institutional feature that 
allows for the stability is the nature of capital inflows which are mainly in the form of 
altruistic remittances, long-term multilateral loans, and foreign direct investments. These 
inflows are less susceptible to sudden reversal.  
    Following the observation of a flat aggregate bank liquidity preference curve, 
the paper proposes the hypothesis that the flat segment of the curve reflects a mark-up 
threshold interest rate. At the flat segment the market interest rate (marginal revenue) is 
just equal to the marginal cost of the interest-earning asset – thus it makes sense for the 
banks to accumulate cash reserves with greater intensity relative to the interest-earning 
asset. The aggregate bank liquidity preference curve allows for the analysis of monetary 
policy shocks in the presence of a mark-up threshold interest rate. By doing so, the paper 
connects the oligopolistic tendency of the money market with that of the foreign 
exchange market. Monetary policy shocks (movements in the reserve supply curve) are 
determined by the Bank of Guyana, which notes that its policy stance focuses on 
managing bank reserves for the purpose of exchange rate and price stability.  
 Although the Bank of Guyana claims to maintain stability through indirect 
monetary policy by the management of excess bank reserves, the oligopolistic tendency 
of the money market will diminish the effectiveness of such a policy. For example, once 
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the threshold interest rate is binding, open market operations will not engender the kind 
of interest rate changes in the loan and deposit markets, thus dampening the effect on the 
exchange rate target. This leaves moral suasion as the more effective tool of monetary 
policy given the increasing tendency towards concentration in the post liberalization era.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure A1: Bank reserves and interest spread – 1998: Q1 to 2009: Q4 
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